Market reaction to earnings news: A unified check of data risk and dealing prices
Highlights
• How do info risk and dealing prices influence reactions to earnings news?
• The paper analyzes each the initial market reaction and consequent worth drift.
• The initial market reaction is higher for higher info risk corporations.
• Information risk induces dealing prices.
• Transaction prices scale back the initial market reaction making consequent worth drift.
Abstract
We examine however info risk and dealing prices influence the initial and consequent market reaction to earnings news. we discover that the initial market reaction is higher per unit of earnings surprise for higher info risk corporations (information content effect). what is more, it's info risk that induces dealing prices that limit the initial market reaction and result in higher consequent drift (transaction prices effect). info risk doesn't have a control on drift on the far side that achieved through dealing prices. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding the linkage between info risk and dealing prices in worth discovery around public revelation.
Economic effects of SOX Section 404 compliance: a company corporate executive perspective
Highlights
• A large majority of insiders from a pair of,901 corporations attribute positive effects to Section 404 compliance.
• Firm quality, however not governance structure, could be a major determinant of perceived compliance effects.
• Insiders don't usually understand compliance advantages to outweigh prices, notably for smaller corporations wherever the start-up prices square measure proportionately larger.
• Perceived potency of compliance will increase with auditor attestation, compliance expertise, once rectification of fabric weaknesses, and following 2007 compliance steerage by SEC and PCAOB.
Abstract
We use survey responses from a pair of,901 company insiders to assess the prices and advantages of compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. the bulk of respondents acknowledge compliance advantages, however they are doing not understand these advantages to outweigh the prices, on average. this is often notably true among smaller corporations wherever the start-up prices square measure proportionately larger. However, the perceived potency of compliance will increase with auditor attestations, years of compliance expertise, and once the rectification of a cloth weakness. Notably, the perceived effects of compliance rely mostly on firm quality, however square measure principally unrelated to firm governance structure.
Debt, equity, and capital investment
Highlights
• Theory suggests that debt funding, relative to equity funding, makes managers reluctant to spare assets.
• However, a firm's investment choices ought to be created severally of its funding choices.
• Our proof reveals that debt funding, relative to equity funding, causes managers to form 2 pricey call errors.
• Debt funding causes participants to predate investments that increase firm worth and settle for investments that decrease firm worth.
Abstract
Theory suggests that debt funding, relative to equity funding, makes managers reluctant to spare assets. Our proof supports this theoretical prediction, revealing that the reluctance to spare a debt supported quality causes 2 call errors—(1) participants predate investments that increase firm worth and (2) participants settle for investments that decrease firm worth. once the supply of finance is equity, participants square measure less seemingly to form either of those pricey call errors. Further, we discover that higher unpaid principal accentuates participants' reluctance to spare debt supported assets. Finally, the choice errors stem, in part, from the perception that associate degree quality having an oversized unpaid principal balance has provided lower past advantages than associate degree otherwise identical quality.
Personally tax aggressive executives and company tax sheltering
Highlights
• I determine the presence of in person tax aggressive (“suspect”) executives.
• I examine company tax sheltering chance with and while not their presence.
• Suspect executives square measure absolutely related to company tax sheltering.
• The results square measure strong to counter-factual testing.
• Suspect executives additionally play a task within the relation between sheltering and firm worth.
Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not executives United Nations agency proof a propensity for private nonpayment (suspect executives) square measure related to tax sheltering at the firm level. I adapt recent analysis to spot the presence of those govts and examine associations between suspect executive presence and firm-level measures of tax sheltering. The results indicate that the presence of suspect executives is absolutely related to proxies for company tax sheltering. additionally, firm-years with suspect govt presence have considerably higher money tax savings relative to firm-years while not suspect govt presence. I additionally investigate the firm worth implications of suspect govt presence and notice that will increase in tax sheltering square measure incrementally additional valuable for corporations that have suspect executives than similar increments created by corporations that don't have suspect executives.
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